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RESEARCH ARTICLE
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aGraduate School of Social Sciences, International Development Studies, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;
bInstituto de Historia y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Austral de Chile, Valdivia, Chile; cCentro de Investigación en Dinámica de
Ecosistemas Marinos de Altas Latitudes, Valdivia, Chile; dCentro de Ciencias del Clima y la Resiliencia, Valdivia, Chile; eInstituto de
Economía Agraria, Universidad Austral de Chile, Valdivia, Chile
ABSTRACT
Antarctica is recognized as being geopolitically and scientifically important, and as one of
the regions with the greatest potential to affect and be affected by global climate change.
Still, little is known in practice about how climate change will be handled within the main
governance framework of the continent: the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). Using quali-
tative interviews, participant observations and policy document analysis, this paper
explores the perspectives of Chilean scientific, political and non-governmental actors
regarding the implications of climate change for the current Antarctic governance frame-
work. Results corroborate a misalignment of the climate change agenda and the ATS,
stemming from the divergent views displayed by a wide network of actors. From the
interviews, two predominant visions emerge: (i) climate change as an opportunity, where
actors recognize the role of Antarctica in regulating global climate and stress greater
opportunities to conduct Antarctic-based climate change research, the need for strategic
international collaboration, and the reinforcement of Chile’s position in Antarctica through
science; (ii) climate change as a burden where actors acknowledge climate change as a
global problem, largely external to Antarctica, express disbelief regarding the effective-
ness of local actions to tackle climate change and do not associate with climate change
governance. The study concludes that climate change may become a dividing, rather than























An increasing number of studies assert that in
order to maintain the integrity of the Antarctic
region and improve its governance, climate change
must be addressed more decisively (Hemmings
et al. 2012; Young 2016). Regardless of the degree
of climate change that is forecast, there is little
doubt that it will act synergically with current
anthropogenic pressures (e.g., globalization) on
the Antarctic marine and terrestrial ecosystems,
exacerbating the effects of the existing impacts
(Halpern et al. 2008; Hoegh-Guldberg & Bruno
2010; Woehler et al. 2014).
Despite the acknowledgement of Antarctica as an
area of distinct concern by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change as early as 2001, it took
the ATS until the late 2000s to put climate change on
its agenda. In 2009, at the 32nd ATCM, SCAR
handed over its Antarctic climate change and envir-
onment review report, which suggested that all treaty
parties commit to mitigating the emissions caused by
their Antarctic operations (Clary & Winther 2010;
Burleson & Huang 2013). Since then, engagement
with climate change governance bodies has become
an integral part of SCAR’s efforts to highlight the key
role of Antarctic science in understanding climate
change.
The underlying challenge is clear yet cumbersome:
to find a mutual ground for synergy between the two
global commons: Antarctica and the global climate.
Although climate change is not defined as a global
commons from a legal perspective, it can be analysed
as such through the lenses of political theory, and
anthropological and environmental studies. A num-
ber of authors in these fields consider climate change
a tragedy of the commons and problematize the gov-
ernance of climate from a global common perspective
(Dietz et al. 2003; Engel & Saleska 2005; Harrison &
Sundstrom 2010; Paavola 2011). The Antarctic com-
mons, on the other hand, is a source of global knowl-
edge, cultural heritage and readily available natural
resources (Herber 2007). In terms of governance,
commons management amounts to regulating
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behaviours rather than resources or property rights
(Vogler 2012). Dietz et al. (2003) connoted the poten-
tial dangers of ineffective commons governance. With
the Antarctic region being a key component of the
Earth system, its preservation also implies acting on
climate governance. Consequently, climate govern-
ance demands attention and effort within the
dynamic framework of the ATS.
Both climate and Antarctic governance are mana-
ged by an intricate mosaic of international treaties,
agreements and agencies. The ATS is an evolving
governance framework which “has developed in a
pragmatic, flexible and, not infrequently, innovative
manner” (Beeby 1991: 10) and has demonstrated
precaution in handling controversial problems (e.g.,
territorial claims, new economic activities). It has
adapted to the challenges of its time, whether envir-
onmental conundrums or conservation of mineral
resources (Joyner 2011). However, steady growth in
the treaty’s membership base strains the existing con-
sensus system, and ATS processes have been deemed
protracted as a result of conflicting interests among
actors (Vidas 2000). Disputes between claimants and
non-claimants, as well as biological prospecting, the
growth of tourism and the question of whaling, have
been listed as potential threats to the integrity of the
treaty (Joyner 2011; Lamers et al. 2012).
In the context of the global commons, such trends
might prove detrimental to the environment unless
effective governance instruments are firmly in place
(Dietz et al. 2003). However, the Antarctic Treaty has
failed to develop a legal response to emerging global
problems: the last instrument added to the ATS was
the Madrid Protocol in 1991 (Hemmings 2017a).
Authors point at the disabling of some important
functions of the ATS and its inability to catch up
with current challenges—what Hemmings (2017b)
has called the “hollowing” of the ATS. “Hollowing”
also prompts Consultative Parties to deflect govern-
ance of local manifestations of global issues to either
global regulation or market forces (Hemmings
2017b). This situation results in fractured and inco-
herent responses to issues such as climate change.
Various models have prescribed methods to gov-
ern climate change and climate commons. Responses
range from top-down approaches (Hare et al. 2010)
to unilateral and domestic arrangements (Engel &
Saleska 2005; Harrison & Sundstrom 2010), to
mechanisms not relying on the role of the state
(Paavola 2011). Paavola (2011) argues that treating
the climate as a common-pool resource reveals even
more dilemmas in regard to climate governance.
Firstly, access to greenhouse gas sinks should respond
to sustainability concerns while still allowing the
many competing users to enjoy their benefits.
Secondly, absence of an exclusion mechanism makes
climate commons particularly challenging to govern.
Despite discussions in the scientific literature about
the effectiveness of other modes of climate commons
governance, the prescription of top-down mechan-
isms has remained dominant in Antarctica. For this
reason, climate change governance at the Antarctic
level remains beyond the grasp of the ATS, despite
climate change being gradually embedded in the
research agenda.
The two distinct governance regimes of the two
mutually inclusive global commons are a compelling
subject for research. Young (1999) posits that the
institutional interplay of governance regimes can
either foster synergy or trigger adverse effects
through mutual interference. Additionally, with
changing environmental systems being under pres-
sure, the political and social constellations around
climate and Antarctic issues may be altered
(Wehrmann 2016). Moreover, under the increasing
importance of post-humanist perspectives (Glasberg
2012; Neimanis et al. 2015; Salazar 2017), the threats
of climate change may transform the interactions
between various actors within and beyond the ATS,
as well as the status of artefacts (Avango 2016) and
non-human agents in the reconfiguration of what is
worth preserving in Antarctica. Considering the mag-
nitude of what is at stake, it is imperative to find
congruence between the two governance frameworks.
This paper explores the views of scientific, political
and non-governmental actors regarding the position
and implications of climate change within the current
Antarctic governance system. As the nation closest to
the continent of Antarctica (850 km away), Chile is one
of the most crucial stakeholders in the Antarctic-related
decision-making process, and its role in shaping the
continental governance cannot be underestimated.
Methods
A case study with an actor-oriented approach (Long
2001) was used in this study because of its flexibility in
exploring emergent issues and ongoing processes
(Merriam & Tisdell 2015). The study employed quali-
tative methods, such as semi-structured interviews,
participant observations and secondary data analysis.
Data were collected during four-month fieldwork from
January to April 2016, in Santiago and Punta Arenas,
the capital of the Magallanes and Chilean Antarctic
Region, the southernmost region of the country. Data
were organized around activities and discourses of key
actors in relation to manifestations of climate change
in Antarctica. Actors were categorized as: political
actors (seven interviews conducted, approximately
eight hours in total); scientific actors (13 interviews
conducted, approximately 15 hours in total); and non-
governmental actors (two interviews conducted,
approximately three hours in total). Participants
came from a variety of backgrounds and included
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officials from the Chilean ministries of foreign affairs,
environment and defence; scientists from the INACH,
SCAR, the Wildlife Conservation Society, the
Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources; and ASOC campaigners.
The uneven distribution of interviewees was deter-
mined by logistics, as well as by the influence of
ASOC on Antarctic affairs. The first interview with
the NGO Wildlife Conservation Society demonstrated
that a rather limited number of the Chilean-based
NGOs conduct campaigns in Antarctica.
Additionally, these NGOs are represented by ASOC,
which determined the choice of the second NGO actor
interviewee. Although the interviewee acted as a
spokesperson for ASOC, the interviewee’s statements
are not assumed to fully represent the opinions of the
organization.
Information was coded and analysed through
Atlas.ti software and discussed among the team in
several sessions of collective hermeneutics (Molitor
2001). For reasons of confidentiality, a simple
nomenclature was adopted to differentiate between
comments from different groups of key actors: (i)
government actors, including the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Environment, INACH
administration, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of
Tourism (G); (ii) NGO actors (NGO); and (iii) scien-
tific community actors (S).
Results
The Chilean institutional context
The ATS views peace, scientific research and envir-
onmental protection as the main frameworks of
reference on the continent (Roura & Bastmeijer
2007; Berkman 2010). In a bid to avoid Antarctica
morphing into “the object of international discord”
(Antarctic Treaty 1959: 2), the continent has been
transformed into a demilitarized natural reserve and
scientific hub. Several respondents referred to Article
3 in the Antarctic Treaty, an article that prescribes
the promotion of collaborative scientific research,
exchange of knowledge from scientific investigation
and “exchange of personnel between expeditions and
stations” (Antarctic Treaty 1959: 3), as particularly
representative of the spirit of the treaty (G2, 3, 4, 5,
6). For these aims, Chile has developed a multi-actor
yet highly centralized governance regime (Fig. 1). The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a monopoly over the
coordination of Antarctic-related matters with its
Antarctic Division, consisting of a small team of 10
people (G6) responsible for
centralizing Antarctic affairs and planning the man-
agement and execution of diplomatic, legal and pol-
icy issues together with relevant national and
international organizations, while safeguarding the
national interest in the conservation and protection
of Antarctica and the sovereign rights of Chile on the
Chilean Antarctic Territory. (G6)
Along with the Antarctic Division is the INACH,
created in 1963 under the auspices of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, “to streamline and facilitate planning,
coordination and financing of Chilean scientific pro-
grammes in the Antarctic” (G2). INACH activities
rest on three pillars: (i) improving the quality of
Chilean Antarctic science; (ii) strengthening the con-
dition of the Antarctic region; and (iii) developing
social capital at a national level through cultural and
Figure 1. Scheme of governance relations between international and Chilean Antarctic actors.
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educational activities (Barticevic 2014). Also of
importance for the national governance regime is
the Chilean Antarctic Policy Council (Consejo de
Política Antártica 2014). The Council depends on
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is a consultative
body in charge of proposing the political, scientific,
economic and legal bases of national action in the
Chilean Antarctic Territory (Consejo de Política
Antártica 2017).
Approved in January 2017 by the Antarctic Policy
Council, the Chilean National Antarctic Policy men-
tions the increasing relevance of climate change and
policies that intend to protect the continent for “both
its ecosystem fragility and its status as a natural
laboratory that meets exceptional conditions for the
development of science” (Consejo de Política
Antártica 2017). Nevertheless, the document fails to
present a specific mechanism to enforce climate pro-
tection, nor does it mention how these objectives
connect to climate change policies defined by the
national institution. Indeed, the rigid governance
scheme led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs side-
lines the Ministry of Environment, which does not
play a pivotal role in the process of Antarctic govern-
ance, as it does in the climate change governance
agenda. In reviewing the links between international
and national levels of decision-making, the ATS
makes no mention of climate change institutions
and rules, and so Antarctica seems to be outside the
domains of climate change bodies. This misalignment
is critically reflected in the Chilean PNACC. PNACC
is a domestic policy instrument, designed in response
to the objectives of the National Strategy on Climate
Change, adopted in January 2006 by the Chilean
Government (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente 2008).
The second PNACC is near to being enacted and its
final draft does not include any specific guidelines for
mitigation or adaptation in Antarctica. Despite
cementing mitigation policies on the national level,
in terms of environmental management in Antarctica
the Ministry of Environment pales beside the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which remains a key
decision-maker in the environmental management
of Antarctica in Chile.
State actors’ appraisal of the status of climate
change within ATS
The narratives from state actors corroborate the mis-
alignment between climate change and ATS govern-
ance regimes and agendas in Chile: “the Ministry of
Environment does not have much to do with
Antarctic issues. Even though the Ministry of
Environment attends those meetings, they do not
participate much. It is our work in progress to
increase their involvement” (G6). This statement pro-
vides insight into the first rupture of dialogue among
Antarctic actors. Some interviewees assumed that
“the ATCM has very little to do with climate change.
Antarctica is no-man’s land so the ATCM is the body
that administrates the continent” (G2) and “in case of
climate change [. . .] the solutions are global and not
specific to the Antarctic” (G6).
Despite these claims, climate research has been an
indelible part of the Chilean Antarctic mission (G5).
However, national policy has only recently reflected
the urgency of climate change. Although Chilean min-
istry officials trumpeted the government’s Antarctic
Strategic Plan 2015–19 (Consejo de Política Antártica
2014) and emphasized that the INACH would lead
climate change research, the plan is infused with the
sentiment of exerting Chilean leverage over the Treaty
as well as enhancing operational capabilities for con-
ducting science in Antarctica. Main strategic goals
include: increasing Chilean participation in ATS;
boosting the profile of the Magallanes region as a
gateway to Antarctica; promoting Antarctic science;
and strengthening logistical capacity of the Chilean
state in Antarctica (Barticevic 2014). Chile hosted the
39th ATCM in May 2016. During this event, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Heraldo Muñoz,
stressed the position of the country in the ATS, and
highlighted future plans and endeavours. The speech
was dominated by ideas of strengthening the position
of Chile “as a country with polar projection” with the
policy motto of “a clean, but useful Antarctica”
(Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2016). The
importance of geopolitical interests was also reflected
in some of the interviews: “we want to have a voice in
Antarctic scientific development and science enables
us to have more influence and greater power” (G5).
Governing the Antarctic morphs into an initiative to
protect national interests within the international com-
munity. In this context, the approach to climate
change is tinged by pragmatism:
It is easier for scientists to convince the government
they want to study the Antarctic because climate
change may affect their economies. Countries do
not think much of Antarctic climate change; they
are thinking of money. But if they see that climate
change will affect their economy, then they will
invest more in science. (G2)
This rationale is used to explain a recent surge in
Antarctic Treaty membership, as the Czech Republic,
Malaysia, Portugal, Colombia and Venezuela have
committed to conducting research on the frozen con-
tinent. While some authors (Salazar 2015) view the
elasticity of the Treaty as controversial and call for
more effective regulation, the Chilean government
welcomed expansion of the Treaty because of the
possibility of more robust cooperation:
You know that there are 29 countries that carry out
scientific programmes in the Antarctic—how to
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create multinational programmes that can address
climate change, collaborate in logistics and monitor
greater areas of the continent? It entails financial
investments and greater international cooperation.
[. . .] Chile in particular has been collaborating with
21 countries. Being the gateway to the Antarctic,
Chile attracts other countries for cooperation.
Recently there has been growing interest from
Asian countries. Today, more than ever, interna-
tional cooperation works in favour of international
governance. (G5)
In May 2017, a state visit to China by Chilean pre-
sident Michelle Bachelet became emblematic of a
surging interest in bilateral cooperation on a variety
of issues, including joint Antarctic research
expeditions.
The view of Chilean Antarctic scientists
The majority of scientific respondents recognized the
strategic importance of the region for the government
and global climate studies. However, the scientists
clearly identified institutional obstacles to accom-
plishing their missions while they are simultaneously
under pressure to properly respond to increasing
national and international demands for knowledge.
For instance, the need for long-term monitoring pro-
jects was clearly stated: “gathering data just once a
year is not enough to study global change” (S1).
Insufficiency of information presents a particular dis-
advantage for climate monitoring, as climate change
does not manifest itself uniformly in different parts of
Antarctica, which complicates the process of drawing
conclusions at this stage. This problem is aggravated
by the fact that international consensus on climate
change partly relies on data from the Antarctic
Peninsula, and some scientists have flagged potential
problems with this research site. Scientists also con-
firmed that project proposals are more likely to be
realized if they feature ideas for international coop-
eration and can be conducted in collaboration with
other Antarctic actors. It is clear that scientists are
incentivized to forge friendly ties with their interna-
tional counterparts to pave the way for successful
joint research missions.
Scientific actors attested to the difficulty of coor-
dinating international collaboration, pointing out that
each country has its own agenda and “runs its own
show in Antarctica” (S4). Furthermore,
for are a lot of countries in the ATS scientists there is
always interest to collaborate, see what equipment
other nations have, study their approach to things.
But the political aspect clashes with it. For example,
Chile and Argentina are so close but we do not
collaborate much because we have the same interest:
to mark our position in Antarctica. (S8)
These power dynamics preclude the government
from crafting more successful and inclusive
environmental policies, harmonious with the
Antarctic ecosystem. Moreover, they drive a wedge
between science and politics, pushing them further
apart. The same issue applied to the international
realm of Antarctic governance, in relation to the
role of SCAR:
SCAR cannot tell policy-makers what to do; they
keep out of the hassle on political-based issues and
focus on evidence-based science. They may suggest
taking that advice into consideration if policies that
are being developed touch upon some areas of SCAR
research. (S3)
Seeing science as subservient to politics, scientific
respondents were willing to switch to a policy-
friendly track provided that the government takes
initiative to set research priorities. At the same time,
the mapping of priorities was seen as a flawed endea-
vour: “science is managed by bureaucrats who cannot
set their priorities straight. We do science for the sake
of doing science but with scarce resources we need to
have priorities, for the development of the country,
institution or university” (S2). This misalignment of
science and politics was also reflected in the scientific
account of the overall absence of a strategy for cli-
mate change, despite aforementioned government
plans stating the contrary: “there is not even a strat-
egy to address climate change” (S4). However, as the
matter narrows down to mitigation practices, scien-
tists should individually and collectively undertake
actions to “reduce the human footprint” (S4).
According to the scientists, this lack of strategy
correlated directly with the perception of climate
change as an external issue that did not originate in
Antarctica (S7). The externality of climate change has
taken its toll on the process of assigning value to the
Antarctic territory by scientists:
I personally am very considerate of [the values] of
the Antarctic environment. I try to always stick to
the same path not to disturb [the species] in the
surrounding areas. Obviously, not all my colleagues
do the same. They are there to take advantage of the
system to advance their research, to benefit from it to
accomplish their scientific mission. We need more
accountability mechanisms [to make sure they com-
ply with regulations] and more evaluations on what
the capacity of the ecosystem is and how much
research it can withstand. (S12)
The scientific vision is conflicted. On one hand,
scientific actors saw the expansion of research activ-
ities as integral to advance climate change-related
policies at the government level. However, as climate
change gains firm grounding in the research agenda,
concerns about the impact of research projects on the
Antarctic ecosystem are also increasing. In the
Chilean context, this aspect clashes with the aspira-
tions of scientists to advance their careers and the
lack of priority-setting from government actors. It
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also leads to a situation where the final product of
research undermines the importance of how the
research was conducted. On the other hand, scientific
actors resisted categorizing themselves as firmly
embedded in the governance process. The impor-
tance of research lessened when considering neglect
from government actors and the marginalized role of
scientists in governance.
Non-governmental actors
In the realm of NGOs, ASOC was chosen for this
research because of the uniqueness of its mission and
its immediate connection with Antarctica. Founded
in 1978, ASOC is the only NGO working full-time to
preserve the Antarctic continent and its surrounding
Southern Ocean. As a coalition of over 30 NGOs
interested in Antarctic environmental protection,
ASOC represents the environmental community at
Antarctic governance meetings and works to promote
important Antarctic conservation goals.
Occupying the role of invited experts, NGOs are
an external body and constitute a kind of buffer
between the different ATS parties. This allows them
to present their agendas and shift the dynamics of
relationships within the treaty system. It has been
claimed that NGOs helped draw public attention to
the effects of climate change in Antarctica (Cohen
2011) and mobilized Treaty stakeholders to weave
this issue into the fabric of annual meetings.
Overall, NGO actors pointed at gaps in the engage-
ment with climate change on the Treaty level:
People are working on it, but it’s a marginalized
issue, which seems weird because Antarctica is
emblematic of global climate change. We see it hap-
pening—the scientists are vocal spokespeople for it
but the ATS wants to put it over to a very slow-
moving international side. (NGO1)
Not only does this assertion signal the conspicuous
absence of a positioned governance system, it also
validates the previously discussed idea of scientists
having an inferior role in the Antarctic Treaty frame-
work: “scientists might think the knowledge is for the
world but the reason why it’s funded by national
programmes is that the Antarctic knowledge makes
the state more powerful” (NGO1). Therefore, the gov-
ernance equilibrium shifts towards government actors
who, as it was shown before, are reluctant to see
beyond climate change research and frame the issue
in support of various national ideological projects.
NGO actors were also not particularly hopeful
about climate change inclusion at the Treaty level.
Under the pretext of the futility of actions initiated in
Antarctica, they opted for letting “the global commu-
nity iron out the big story” (NGO1). Antarctica was
only perceived as a platform where actors can lead by
demonstrating an example of environmentally con-
scious behaviour.
As a result, strategies to tackle climate change from
the NGO perspective rest on three pillars: reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions; implementation of cli-
mate adaptation strategies; and climate science boost.
The first pillar involves slashing carbon emissions
through energy efficiency measures:
There are a lot of countries in the ATS doing great
things when they build new bases. Belgium was run-
ning one of its stations on renewable energy and one
of the new UK stations is amazing, with solar and
wind power; it is a futuristic model for what is
possible. But it does not negate the fact that going
to the Antarctic is one of the most carbon intensive
things one can do because everything needs to come
with you to sustain your life.(NGO1)
Secondly, NGO actors agree that climate change
impacts should be taken into account during manage-
ment decisions about fisheries, protected areas and
ecosystem resilience build-up: “the protected areas
system is very good and very intelligently managed,
there is international cooperation . . . it does not mean
it is always conflict-free, there are debates, discus-
sions, blocking but it turns out pretty well”
(NGO1). Lastly, while recognizing flaws in the chan-
nels of scientific communication, NGO actors
stressed the importance of streamlined research
work in Antarctica for more effective climate change
governance administration at the international level.
While all the above-mentioned measures are cru-
cial for addressing climate change, governance pro-
cess extends beyond reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions, implementation of climate adaptation stra-
tegies and boosting climate science. Unlike other
actors, NGO stakeholders observed the possibility of
global warming bringing further issues of resource
access and conservation to the fore:
I am interested to see how this renewable energy
transition that I feel has kick-started it is going to
protect the Antarctic because there is always this
spectre of mining or extracting resources and if we
can advocate for world energy systems to transition
to renewable energy before we have to raise that
question, it’ll help. (NGO1)
It is important to state that from the perspective of
the NGO representative, preservation of Antarctica in
a climate change scenario is not the problem of a
specific country, such as Chile; rather an issue on a
global scale that requires coordinated collaborative
action of multiple, international stakeholders.
Discussion and conclusion
By the end of the past decade, climate change was
finally accepted as an “Antarctic issue”, reflected by
the intention “to work along [work together towards
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a common goal] to better understand changes to the
Earth’s climate and actively seek ways to address the
effects of climate and environmental change on the
Antarctic environment and dependent and associated
ecosystems” (Comba 2013: 313). Yet “working along”
has proved to be a challenging task, and success is
still ahead. Exercising the possibility of integration of
climate change into the ATS regime, this research
explored visions of scientific, political and non-gov-
ernmental actors in Chile regarding the topic in ques-
tion. Our aim was not to project the Chilean case on
the rest of the ATS, but rather to provide insight into
the complexity of politicizing global warming in the
context of the global commons and interlocked
national agendas.
The current climate strategy at the Antarctic
Treaty level is the product of scientific knowledge
and is an integral part of the Antarctic governance
framework. Not only does science validate govern-
ance decisions, it provides a governance framework
itself (O’Reilly 2017). However, generation of the
above-mentioned knowledge also takes place in the
context of climate change, which, as it was deter-
mined, takes its toll on the Antarctic ecosystem. The
global commons vicious cycle conundrum challenges
the treaty system, with Antarctic stakeholders, in
theory, having to work on conducting research, keep-
ing the global climate system in check and ensuring
that knowledge production practices do not increase
ecosystem vulnerability.
Our results show the challenge of finding synergy
between the two commons. Chile has long been an
active participant in the ATS and displays a formid-
able yet highly hierarchical governance structure for
the task. However, climate change governance
regimes and processes are still in their infancy,
although evolving rapidly. In synthesis, for the
Chilean actors involved, the space for convergence
of the two global commons appears to be tightly
connected to the role of science as a mediator
among governance regimes. Yet for the ATS, science
has acquired an additional geopolitical meaning,
whereas for the climate change agenda the practice
of science can provoke negative externalities that
must be handled within the ATS. Institutional mis-
alignment is easily observable, and, in the context of
this divide, science seems to arise as the bridge
between the two governance agendas while also con-
stituting a governance framework itself. There are
two further dimensions from which we can examine
Chilean actors’ perspective on Antarctic climate
governance.
The first is climate change as an opportunity. All
actors saw the governance climate change agenda as
timely. However, each actor was motivated by self-
interest, which resulted in sometimes contradictory,
sometimes competing, visions of opportunity. For
instance, cooperation was viewed solely as a pathway
to conduct research in a more efficient and adroit
manner. As a result, Antarctica is not perceived as “a
site of contestation and reconfiguration of ways of
thinking and making decisions about climate change”
(Beck 2010: 9). Instead, climate change discourse
favouring the expansion of scientific activity is
actively perpetuated, and governments respond to
this discourse by incorporating it into their paradigm
of interests, which is preoccupied with preserving
their territorial claim and having political clout in
Antarctica. Political actors respond to climate change
with a set of discrete local mitigation measures, while
seeing climate change research as a geopolitical exer-
cise, and climate change knowledge as a product of
“the struggles, confrontations and tactics of power”
(Shadian & Tennberg 2009: 189).
Chilean scientific actors, while enjoying the oppor-
tunity to advance their careers, lament their lack of
opportunity to engage in the governance process.
According to ethnographic research (O’Reilly 2017),
scientists come across as “arbiters” and agents of
authority over environmental management and gov-
ernance arrangements. However, some of the institu-
tionalized practices of the Chilean Antarctic
governance do not empower scientists to realize
their potential in these matters. Additionally, they
fail to recognize science as pivotal for strengthening
the legal regime in Antarctica, and, instead of being
agents of governance, scientists focus primarily on
their career development. Finally, non-governmental
actors venture to politicize climate change in
Antarctica, while advocating for more mitigation
and adaptation measures locally, but do not step
beyond these policies.
The second dimension is climate change as a bur-
den. Scientific and NGO actors also perceived climate
change governance agenda in terms of burden.
Ambition to expand research activities provokes the
dilemma that research itself may contribute to envir-
onmental degradation (Pertierra et al. 2013).
Antarctica has long been considered “a salient symbol
of surviving wilderness” (Stokke & Vidas 1996: 5), an
idea that invokes a balance between the effects of
exploring and researching and the value of protecting
it from impacts (Pertierra et al. 2013).
It is evident that the discourses of Chilean actors
engaged in the governance process do not overlap.
While actors might view climate change as an
opportunity and/or burden, their interpretation of
these agendas is distinctly different. Additionally,
the proponents of more efficient governance
schemes see coordination between actors as a pre-
requisite (Tin et al. 2014). Coordination is encapsu-
lated by compatible goals (Tin et al. 2014), and the
discourse divergence drives the actors’ goals further
apart.
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Moreover, climate change is potent enough to alter
the values of the ATS (Wehrmann 2016). Considering
the growing importance of global forces in Antarctica,
it is possible to observe a shift from scientific coopera-
tion to commercial pressure as the dominant policy
force in the region. Hemmings (2007) posits that "[t]he
Antarctic system will not collapse tomorrow but it
does appear to be in relative decline, and power is
shifting from states to non-state entities, and particu-
larly to commercial interests." Zarankin & Salerno
(2014:117) remind us that “Antarctica’s present dis-
tinctive features are nothing but a product of the
historical strategies defining the human expansion
over and the interaction with the continent.” In spite
of these transformations, Chilean actors have not yet
developed mechanisms to address climate change in
Antarctica. Since the issue of climate change entered
the Antarctic Treaty agenda in the mid-2000s after
purposeful reluctance to address it (Chaturvedi 2012),
actors have been engaging with the physical changes
catalysed by global warming, rather than with the
political and legal regime quandaries (Davis 2014).
This apathy maintains the status quo (Tin et al.
2014), entrenching the existing sovereign claims and
nationalistic imaginations on the continent. However,
climate change is an assertive force that calls into
question the viability of the ATS in its current state
(Tin et al. 2014), and acknowledging this requires
stronger cooperation and dismissal of geopolitical
concerns.
Considering this rich tapestry of opinions,
approaches and visions, the Chilean case can be clas-
sified neither as synergy nor as interference (sensu
Young 1999). Instead, Chile provides an example of
institutional misalignment that results in the current
inability to converge the ATS and climate change
governance. As actors demonstrate different degrees
of engagement (Treml et al. 2015) with climate
change matters and different approaches to its inter-
pretation, the issue becomes divisive.
Having taken into account these findings, we can
chart two paths for future research and analysis. The
first might explore the specific intersections—actors,
policies and mechanisms—between governance
regimes of the two global commons, both at the
international and national levels, in a comparative
perspective. The second path suggests taking an eth-
nographic perspective to identify current practices
and socio-material arrangements by which different
actors establish mechanisms of compliance or non-
compliance with existing governance agreements. It
can be concluded that the potential for alignment
between the ATS and climate change governance in
Chile is still rather low because of the lack of a
unifying vision between actors regarding what cli-
mate change means for Antarctic governance and
vice versa. However, being confronted by the global
menace of a warming planet, Antarctic actors must
create local responses to the challenge of climate
change, thus opening the possibility of Antarctic cli-
mate change governance. It begs the question
whether the ATS parties, including Chile and its
different actors, are prepared to concede to this com-
promise for the greater good of the planet and envir-
onmental protection of the continent.
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